
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STAFF NOTES:

# Soviet Union Eastern Europe

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### New Romanian Proposals at the UN

Romania will soon flout Soviet desires by presenting the UN General Assembly a new set of initiatives on disarmament and proposed amendments to the UN charter. Foreign Minister Macovescu has already taken the unusual step of briefing the US and eight West European ambassadors on the Romanian plans. Macovescu said he has instructed the Romanian ambassador in Washington to present the proposals directly to Secretary Kissinger in advance.

Some of the proposals will be especially galling to the Soviets. Bucharest wants to delete the "enemy states" provisions of articles 53 and 107 of the charter, which permit the victors in World War II to intervene in the internal affairs of former "enemy states." The Romanians, who originally sided with the Axis, fear that Moscow might use these clauses to justify intervention in Romania. In the past, Bucharest has repeatedly failed to win Soviet assurances that Moscow would not employ the articles for this purpose.

The Romanians have also called for specific recognition of the need for a "new international economic order." This proposal strikes directly at Communist doctrine because it would divide the world into "have" and "have-not" countries instead of classifying them by political system. The proposal depicts Romania as a developing country--a status the Soviets reject.

The Romanian package also contains other elements that seem designed to appeal to the nonaligned states. On disarmament, for example, Bucharest's initiatives call for pledges against nuclear war, the supervised elimination of nuclear stockpiles, and immediate cuts of 10 percent in the military budgets of member states—half of which would go to the UN development fund. They also plan to reiterate their call for the simultaneous liquidation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

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Bucharest is also advocating certain changes in the charter that would alter the functions of the UN Sucurity Council. For example, they propose to increase the Council's membership as well as to enhance the role of the General Assembly in an effort to provide more effective procedures for mediating disputes. The Romanians, who were recently elected to merve on the Council for the first time since 1962, hope their proposals will dilute Seviet influence in the international arena. They also plan to propose a code of conduct for UN members that would incorporate their own well-known principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs.

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## Moscow Again Flirting with Seoul

Moscow's decision to allow a Soviet UNESCO official to visit Seoul demonstrates Soviet pique with Pyongyang; it does not, however, presage any radical departure in Soviet policy toward South Korea.

The Soviet official, who arrived in South Korea on October 28, is only the second Soviet to visit Seoul since the Korean war; the first was a soccer coach who traveled there with an Iranian team in 1971. His visit comes on the heels of a Soviet decision to allow two military attaches to attend South Korea's National Day reception in Paris on October 3 and three South Korean visits to the USSR in August and October.

Moscow has made modest gestures of this sort in the past in an effort to make Pyongyang aware of the cost of continuing to be insensitive to Soviet concerns. In 1971 and 1972, for instance, the Soviets were caught off guard by Pyongyang's decision to pursue more conciliatory tactics toward South Korea and reacted by exploring Seoul's offer to seek contacts with non-hostile Communist countries. The Soviets pulled back in 1973, however, when the North Koreans moved to improve relations with Moscow and publicly blasted Seoul for its attempts to sow disunity among the socialist countries.

Moscow recognizes that if it is to exercise any leverage on the Korean problem, it must have good relations with Pyongyang, but the current gestures toward Seoul suggest relations with the North are not going well. Soviet military and economic assistance to North Korea has declined markedly in the last two years and Soviet officials have recently voiced suspicions about the allegedly growing warmth in Peking's relations with Pyongyang. They have also been more openly critical than ever before about North Korean party leader Kim Il-Song's domestic and foreign policy objectives.

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Croat Secret Police Chief Cites "War" on Emigres and Subversives	
Ivo Pervan, the chief of secret police in Croatia, recently told leaders of the republic's mass organization that the regime is "virtually waging war" against emigre-terrorists and subversives.	
Pervan warned against increased activities by Stalinists and said that "certain persons"at least 20, are already under investigation for factionalist activity in Croatia. He said that Stalinists are at work in Zagreb and the Dalmatian coast as well as in Kordun and Slavonia, where large numbers of Serbs live.	25X
Pervan made it plain that he considers emigre terrorists in the West to be an increasing menace. He mentioned a recent effort by Croat emigres of all political stripes to form a government-in-exile, called the Croat National Council. He added that SOPO, a Serb emigre group, had resumed its local activity. Pervan also revealed that a group of emigre nationalists in Zagreb was recently arrested for spying on military targets and the top leaders, and for collecting arms and disseminating propaganda materials.	
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New Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs	
Nikolay A. Rozhkov was appointed a deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on September 3, according to a Soviet announcement only recently available to the US embassy in Moscow. Rozhkov had previously served as deputy chairman of the Moscow City Executive Committee and as secretary of the Moscow city party committee. He had also been chairman of the city's planning commission. A plenum of the Moscow party organization released him from his party post on September 24.	•
The reason for Rozhkov's transfer to the Internal Affairs Ministry is unclear. By training he is a civil engineer, and he is not known to have any experience in law enforcement. It is rumored in Moscow that he was fired in connection with a scandal in the construction industry involving large sums of money. His new position and the timing of his release from his party position make this explanation suspect. Rozhkov's new responsibilities are unknown, but his background as a civil engineer would be useful in police efforts against white collar crime in the construction industry, where embezzlement and misappropriation are rampant.	
The new deputy minister has no apparent ties to any major political figure. His work in the Moscow government and party apparatus, however, would have brought him into contact with Politburo member Grishin and V. F. Promyslov, mayor of Moscow. In addition, V. S. Paputin, who was first deputy minister of internal affairs last year, served as second secretary of the Moscow Obkom from 1967-74.	
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#### Chernenko May Be Moving Toward Brezhnev Staff Role

Konstantin Chernenko, a key CPSU Central Committee department head and an associate of General Secretary Brezhnev for more than 20 years, may have taken over some staff work that is usually done by Brezhnev's personal aides.

In 1974, Chernenko was described as "responsible for publication" of a volume of Brezhnev's speeches on the Communist Education of the Workers. This is a task that in the past was performed by personal aides or by officials about whom little or nothing is known. British Sovietologist Leonard Shapiro speculates that Chernenko is expanding the responsibilities of Central Committee General Department that he has headed since 1965. Chernenko's association with Brezhnev dates from the years 1948 to 1956 when both men served in the Moldavian Party.

Shapiro, analyzing other material concerning the General Department, points out that under Stalin the department was indistinguishable from the Soviet dictator's personal secretariat, that under Khrushchev the department was dissociated from that function, and that Brezhnev, unlike Khrushchev, had appointed his own associate—Chernenko—almost as soon as he took over the Party leadership. Chernenko's editing of Brezhnev's works recalls earlier days when a similar service was performed by Stalin's secretary Poskrebyshev who also headed what is now the General Department.

The General Department handles the communications and correspondence of CPSU Politburo and Secretariat members. Chernenko accompanied Brezhnev to Helsinki in July for the final session of CSCE. While his attendance there was compatible with his function as the official recorder of important party proceedings, this was the first time that a head of the General Department had accompanied a party chief on a trip abroad.

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